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Abstract: Various peer-to-peer energy markets have emerged in recent years in an attempt to
manage distributed energy resources in a more efficient way. One of the main challenges these
models face is how to create and allocate incentives to participants. Cooperative game theory
offers a methodology to financially reward prosumers based on their contributions made to the
local energy coalition using the Shapley value, but its high computational complexity limits the
size of the game. This paper explores a stratified sampling method proposed in existing literature
for Shapley value estimation, and modifies the method for a peer-to-peer cooperative game to
improve its scalability. Finally, selected case studies verify the effectiveness of the proposed
coalitional stratified random sampling method and demonstrate results from large games.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The increasing penetration of distributed energy resources
(DER) poses challenges to distribution network operation.
One of the most important topics recent researches have
been focusing on is how to maintain the reliability of
energy supply while encouraging distributed renewable
generation, which is highly variable and intermittent,
see Skea et al. (2007). Curtailment is applied in some
networks with high renewable generation, see Jacobsen
and Schroder (2012). However, it introduces inefficiency
into the energy system and financially penalizes owners
of renewable resources. Centralized control of DER is
also proposed in various researches, but they tend to
overlook the fact that prosumers, proactive-consumers
with distributed energy resources that actively control
their energy behaviors, are independent entities who need
incentives to participate in such a centralized control
scheme, see Morstyn et al. (2018). The idea of setting
up a peer-to-peer (P2P) energy sharing scheme is gaining
tremendous attention both in the industry and academia
in recent years, as it is considered a key market strategy to
financially encourage efficient local management of DER,
see Parag and Sovacool (2016).
A key feature of a P2P sharing scheme is its ability to
use local flexibility to offset generation uncertainty. Local
flexibility often takes the form of energy storage (ES),
which can be modeled in a similar way as other types of
? This work was supported in part by the Engineering and Phys-
ical Sciences Research Council under Grants EP/N03466X/1 and
EP/S000887/1, and in part by the Oxford Martin Programme on
Integrating Renewable Energy.
flexible demand, see Sajjad et al. (2016). This paper makes
the common assumption that the price to export energy
to the energy network is lower than the price to import,
see Zhou et al. (2018); hence, for a single prosumer, the
benefit of flexibility is easily reflected in their energy bills
when they increase the local usage of their own generation
by optimally scheduling their ES. In a P2P market, more
joint benefit can be reaped from matching local flexibility
with variable generation among all the participants. At the
same time, however, it becomes a challenge to allocate the
benefit to each participant in an efficient and fair way.
Game theory has been adopted in some recent research
to look at how to affect prosumer behavior using financial
incentives. Dynamic pricing coupled with non-cooperative
game theory is one of the most popular topics, see Jia and
Tong (2016), but it fails to demonstrate consistent benefit
for every participant, see Han et al. (2019). Cooperative
game theory is proposed as an alternative approach and is
shown in Han et al. (2018) that financial rewards can be
fairly allocated using the Shapley value, which is based on
the contribution each prosumer makes to this joint scheme.
A player’s Shapley value in a cooperative game is a
weighted average of their marginal contribution to all the
possible coalitions among all players, see Shapley (1971).
For an N -player game, there are 2N possible coalitions,
which means that the computation of Shapley value be-
comes intractable when increasing the number of players.
The estimation of the Shapley value has been explored in
some previous literature, sampling being the main method-
ology. An example is the cooperative scheme described in
Chapman et al. (2017), but the model is constructed as
simple games with a binary outcome representing whether
a coalition of battery-owning households can overcome a
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hard network constraint. This scheme overlooks the con-
tributions made by local generation or ES units that are
not big enough to switch the binary outcome.
To improve the scalability of the P2P cooperative game
proposed in Han et al. (2018), this paper identifies a
random sampling method as a way to estimate the Shapley
value. The method was proposed in Castro et al. (2009),
and then modified in Castro et al. (2017) by adding a strat-
ification step to the sampling, improving the accuracy of
the estimation. This paper adapts this stratified sampling
method by further creating coalitional strata for better
performance in this specific application. The proposed
sampling method enables the P2P game to scale up, and
we are then able to analyze the impact of different DER
adoption rates on prosumer profitability. Some interesting
findings are shown in the case studies.
2. P2P COOPERATIVE GAME
In an N -player cooperative game, the grand coalition N
is defined as the group of all N players. Any subset of
the grand coalition T : T ⊆ N is called a coalition. The
basic framework of the P2P cooperative game proposed
in Han et al. (2018) involves mainly three steps. Step 1 is
to cooperatively manage DER within all coalitions, which
requires optimally scheduling the ES units to minimize
the coalitional energy cost, see Subsection 2.1. Step 2 is to
quantify the value of forming each coalition, see Subsection
2.2. Step 3 is to divide the total energy cost savings from
forming the grand coalition to all the players based on
certain criteria, see Subsection 2.3.
2.1 Coalitional Energy Management
We index each prosumer by i and the grand coalition
by i ∈ N := {1, 2, ..., N}. If we consider K timesteps
(t = 1, 2, ...,K) with a time interval of ∆t, the total energy
cost of a coalition T can be written as
FT (b) =
K∑
t=1
∑
i∈T
{
rimt [pit + bit]
+ + rext [pit + bit]
−
}
where subscripts i and t are indices for the player and
the timestep respectively. The known inputs are rimt , r
ex
t ,
and pit, which are electricity import price (£/kWh), elec-
tricity export price (£/kWh), and net energy consumption
(positive) or generation (negative) (kWh) without ES. The
variables are b ∈ RN×K := bit,∀i ∈ [1, N ],∀t ∈ [1,K]: ES
charge (positive) or discharge (negative) energy (kWh).
We also define operation [z]+(−) = max(min){z, 0}.
With the assumption rimt > r
ex
t ,∀t, we can schedule all
the ES units’ operation within coalition T to minimize
the coalitional energy cost G(T ), which is defined as
G(T ) = min
b
FT (b)
s.t. bi ≤ bit ≤ bi, ∀i ∈ T ,∀t ∈ [1,K] (1)
0 ≤ eiSoC0i +
k∑
t=1
([bit]
+ηini + [bit]
−/ηouti ) ≤ ei
∀i ∈ T ,∀k ∈ [1,K] (2)
K∑
t=1
([bit]
+ηini + [bit]
−/ηouti ) = 0, ∀i ∈ T (3)
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Fig. 1. 16 Prosumer loads: (a) individual load consump-
tion, (b) individual load including PV generation, (c)
grand coalition load and non-cooperative and cooper-
ative ES operation profiles, (d) grand coalition load
with non-cooperative and cooperative ES operation.
where (1), (2), and (3) represent the ES power constraint,
energy constraint, and cycle constraint respectively. We
consider each prosumer i’s ES system has an energy
capacity (kWh) of ei ≥ 0, a charge limit (kWh) of bi ≥ 0
and a discharge limit (kWh) of bi ≥ 0 over the time span
of ∆t, a charge efficiency of ηini ∈ (0, 1) and a discharge
efficiency of ηouti ∈ (0, 1), and an initial state of charge of
SoC0i ∈ [0, 1]. For a prosumer who does not own an ES
system, we set their energy capacity and charge/discharge
limits all as zeros.
Fig. 1 demonstrates the effect of cooperative ES oper-
ation in a 16-prosumer scenario. As shown in (d), the
cooperative ES operation tends to flatten the load as it
tries to match the consumption and generation within the
coalition to minimize the coalition energy cost.
2.2 Value of Coalitions
The purpose of using cooperative game theory is to es-
tablish a framework to quantify the benefit of coopera-
tion, and then to allocate the benefit to the participants
efficiently. The coalitional energy cost provides a great
metric to evaluate a coalition’s performance. Here, we
define the value of a coalition T as the energy cost savings
obtained by forming the coalition. This is given by the
difference between the sum of the energy costs incurred by
each prosumer in T when they schedule the ES systems
individually, and the minimum coalitional energy cost of T
when the prosumers schedule their ES systems collectively:
v(T ) =
∑
i∈T
G({i})−G(T )
By this definition, the value of the grand coalition becomes
the total energy cost savings of a P2P cooperative game,
which denotes the total amount of payoffs we can award
to all the participants.
2.3 Prosumer Payoffs and Shapley Value
The second step in a cooperative game framework is the
allocation of payoffs. We use vector x ∈ RN as the payoff
allocation whose entry xi represents the payment to pro-
sumer i ∈ N . One important payoff allocation is called the
Shapley value denoted as φi,∀i ∈ N , see Shapley (1971),
representing each player’s weighted average marginal con-
tribution to all possible coalitions within the game:
φi =
∑
T ⊂N ,i/∈T
(|T |)!(N − |T | − 1)!
N !
[v(T ∪ i)− v(T )] (4)
The Shapley value also satisfies the following axioms:
(1) (Efficiency)
∑
i∈N φi = v(N ). This requires the
entirety of the value created by the grand coalition
to be allocated to the players.
(2) (Individual Rationality) φi ≥ v({i}),∀i ∈ N . This
ensures that no player is penalized for cooperating.
(3) (Symmetry) If v(T ∪ {i}) = v(T ∪ {j}),∀T ⊆ N , T ∩
{i, j} = ∅, then φi = φj . This means that two
players should be assigned the same Shapley value
if they have the same marginal contributions to all
the coalitions.
(4) (Dummy Axiom) If v(T ) = v(T ∪ {i}),∀T ⊆ N , T ∩
{i} = ∅, then φi = 0. Therefore, a player’s Shapley
value should be zero if they add zero marginal value
to any of the coalitions.
(5) (Additivity) If v and u are characteristic functions,
then φi(v+u) = φi(v)+φi(u),∀i ∈ N . This indicates
that the Shapley value of two games played at the
same time should be the sum of the two games’
Shapley values when played separately.
Axiom (1) guarantees that all the profits allocated to
the prosumers add up to the total energy cost savings
from the grand coalition. In our P2P cooperative game,
v({i}) = 0,∀i ∈ N , so Axiom (2) requires φi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N .
Axiom (3) and (4) ensure the ‘fairness’ of the payoff
allocation. Axiom (5) is not actively used in this paper
as the P2P cooperative game is the only game discussed
here.
The Shapley value offers a way to incentivize prosumers
to participate in this cooperative scheme, improving the
local energy supply reliability while encouraging the ef-
ficient use of distributed renewable generation. However,
the scalability of the proposed model is very limited be-
cause the Shapley value’s computational time increases
exponentially with the size of the grand coalition. The
following section looks into a sampling method to estimate
the Shapley value to reduce the model’s computational
complexity.
3. ESTIMATION OF SHAPLEY VALUE
The scalability of the P2P cooperative game model is
mainly limited by the sheer number of cost minimization
problems that are required to be solved. This number is
equal to the number of possible coalitions, 2N , where N is
the number of participating prosumers. Since the Shapley
value is the weighted average of a player’s marginal contri-
butions, sampling is identified as a promising estimation
technique to be applied in our P2P cooperative game.
3.1 Stratified Random Sampling
The conventional definition is expressed in (4). Weber
(1977) provided an alternative definition of the Shapley
value expressed in terms of all possible orders of the
players, which was then adopted by Castro et al. (2009)
to develop a random sampling method to estimate the
Shapley value. In this approach, pi(N ) is defined as the
set of all possible permutations with player set N , and
O : N → N as a permutation that assigns player O(k) to
position k. For a given O ∈ pi(N ), the set of predecessors
of the player i is denoted as Prei(O), where if i = O(k),
Prei(O) = {O(1), O(2), ..., O(k − 1)}. Player i’s marginal
contribution is δ(O)i = v(Pre
i(O) ∪ i)− v(Prei(O)). The
alternative definition of Shapley value can be written as
φi =
∑
O∈pi(N )
1
N !
δ(O)i, i ∈ N (5)
Since |pi(N )| = N ! and δ(O)i are equally weighted for
all O ∈ pi(N ) in (5), the Shapley value can be estimated
using the unweighted expectation of δ(O)i given a set of
randomly sampled permutations M :
φi =
∑
O∈M
1
|M |δ(O)i, i ∈ N (6)
The alternative definition of the Shapley value is just a
special case where M = pi(N ).
Using (6), the Shapley value can be estimated from ran-
domly sampling player permutations, see Castro et al.
(2009). To improve the estimation accuracy, Castro et al.
(2017) proposed a stratified random sampling approach
to divide the population of all player permutations into
subpopulations that have the same size of predecessors
for each player. This stratified random sampling method
follows the following steps.
(1) A stratum, or a stratified set of player permutations
is defined as Pil := {O ∈ pi(N ) | O(l) = i,∀i, l ∈
[1, N ]}. Therefore, Pil contains every permutation
O ∈ pi(N ), in which player i is in position l. Player
i’s mean marginal contribution of each stratum is
φil =
1
|Pil|
∑
O∈Pil
δ(O)i,∀i, l ∈ [1, N ] (7)
(2) A random permutation sample Mil of size |Mil| is
obtained with replacement from each stratum Pil.
(3) Adapted from (7), player i’s mean marginal contribu-
tion of the samples from each stratum is
φil =
1
|Mil|
∑
O∈Mil
δ(O)i,∀i, l ∈ [1, N ] (8)
The estimated Shapley value can then be calculated
as φ
st
i =
∑N
l=1
1
N φil,∀i ∈ [1, N ].
We notice that in (8), δ(O)i are equally weighted for all
O ∈ Mil. Because each player set (coalition) Prei(O)
appears (l − 1)!(N − l)! times for a given l, they have
the same probability of being sampled from Pil into Mil.
We define the coalitional stratum as the set of coalitions
Qil := {T ⊆ N | i /∈ T , |T | = l − 1,∀i, l ∈ [1, N ]},
and ∆(T )i = v(T ∪ i) − v(T ). We then obtain a random
sample Hil with replacement from Qil, and because the
order of players does not matter in a coalition, Hil can be
considered a combination sample. (8) can be rewritten as
φil =
1
|Hil|
∑
T ∈Hil
∆(T )i,∀i, l ∈ [1, N ] (9)
3.2 Modified Sampling with Optimal Sample Allocation
In order to implement the stratified random sampling
method, a procedure to determine the sample size of each
stratum needs to be established. Castro et al. (2009) iden-
tified the true variance as a metric to allocate the samples
among strata to minimize the estimation error, and pro-
posed a two-stage Shapley value estimation algorithm with
optimal sample allocation. In the first stage, 50% of the
samples are evenly distributed to each stratum to obtain
an initial estimated Shapley value and each stratum’s
sample variance. In the second stage, the remaining 50%
of the samples are optimally allocated to each stratum in
proportion to their sample variances calculated in the first
stage. The final estimated Shapley value is then calculated
using the sampling results from both stages.
We then recognize that |Qil| = (N−1)!(l−1)!(N−l)! , which means
that evenly dividing the samples in the first stage could
result in a sample size larger than the size of some
coalitional strata: |Hil| > |Qil|, especially when l is close to
1 or N . Applying random sampling to obtain φil in these
coalitional strata would take even more time and produce
less accurate results than directly calculating φil:
φil =
1
|Qil|
∑
T ∈Qil
∆(T )i,∀i, l ∈ [1, N ] (10)
Using (9) and (10), we modify the two-stage stratified
random sampling method with optimal sample allocation
to estimate the Shapley value. This modified method is
detailed in Algorithm 1.
In Stage 1, in the case where the evenly distributed sample
size is bigger than the stratum size, we compute the
stratum’s precise mean marginal contribution φil, and
add the saved samples to Stage 2. This way, we can
improve the accuracy of the estimation both by using the
precise stratum marginal contribution, and by increasing
the number of samples for optimal allocation.
4. CASE STUDIES
In the following two case studies, we implement the pro-
posed sampling method to estimate the Shapley value of
our P2P cooperative game. In the first case study, we
select a range of prosumer numbers so we can compare
the computational time of the estimated Shapley value
and the actual Shapley value, and evaluate the accuracy
of the estimation. In the second case study, we scale up the
size of the game to evaluate the payoffs to the prosumers
based on their DER types.
Some of the model inputs are as follows: the domestic
load data was measured in the Customer-Led Network
Revolution trials 1 . the model time frame is 24 hours
starting from the midnight of a sunny summer day in
July. The PV systems are 4kW with fixed 20 degree tilt,
simulated in PVWatts 2 using the London Gatwick solar
data. The ES model has an energy capacity of 7 kWh, a
maximum charge power of 3.5 kW, a maximum discharge
power of 3.2 kW, both charge and discharge efficiencies
of 95%, an initial state of charge of 50%, and a state of
1 http://www.networkrevolution.co.uk/resources/project-library
2 http://pvwatts.nrel.gov/pvwatts.php
Algorithm 1 Two-Stage Coalitional Stratified Random
Sampling with Optimal Sample Allocation
Stage 1
h← total sample size
hAil ← h2N2
Ω← ∅ : set of strata with sample sizes determined
for i ∈ [1, N ], l ∈ [1, N ] do
if hAil > |Qil| = (N−1)!(l−1)!(N−l)! then
HAil ← Qil, htotil ← |Qil|
h← h− |Qil|, Ω← Ω ∪ (i, l)
else
HAil ← hAil samples with replacement from Qil
Φil ← 0, s← 0
for T ∈ HAil do
Φil ← Φil + ∆(T )i, s← s+ (∆(T )i)2
σ2il ← 1|HA
il
|−1 (s−
(Φil)
2
|HA
il
| )
Stage 2
ω ← {(0, 0)}: initialize ω to start following while loop
while ω 6= ∅ do
for i ∈ [1, N ], l ∈ [1, N ] and (i, l) /∈ Ω do
htotil ← h σ
2
il∑N
i=1
∑N
l=1
σ2
il
hBil ← htotil − hAil
ω ← ∅ : set of over-sampled strata in Stage 1
for i ∈ [1, N ], l ∈ [1, N ] and (i, l) /∈ Ω do
if hBil < 0 then
htotil ← hAil , h← h− hAil , ω ← ω ∪ (i, l)
Ω← Ω ∪ ω
for i ∈ [1, N ], l ∈ [1, N ] and (i, l) /∈ Ω do
HBil ← hBil samples with replacement from Qil
for T ∈ HBil do
Φil ← Φil + ∆(T )i
φil ← Φilhtot
il
for i ∈ [1, N ], l ∈ [1, N ]
φ
cl,st,opt
i ←
∑N
l=1
1
N φil for i ∈ [1, N ]
return φ
cl,st,opt
i , i ∈ [1, N ]
charge range of 20-95%. The energy import price follows
a UK Economy 7 residential rate structure: £0.072/kWh
for midnight–7am, and £0.1681/kWh for 7am–midnight 3 ,
and the energy export price is the UK feed-in tariff 4 fixed
at £0.0485/kWh.
4.1 Validation of Sampling-Based Shapley Estimation
In this case study, we fix the the PV and ES adoption
rates both at 50%, and both ownerships are randomly
assigned independently of each other. In other words, each
prosumer can have a PV system, or an ES system, or both,
or neither. We apply a range of prosumer numbers to
compare the computation time between the full Shapley
value calculation and the Shapley value estimation with
the proposed sampling method.
Compared against each other are three models: 1) full
Shapley value calculation, 2) Shapley value estimation
using the proposed sampling method with 103 samples per
3 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/annual-
domestic-energy-price-statistics
4 https://www.gov.uk/feed-in-tariffs/overview
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player, and 3) Shapley value estimation using the proposed
sampling method with 102 samples per player.
Table 1 shows the computation time 5 of the three models.
We only show computation times that are under 10 hours
as we consider any time above 10 hours to be impractical
for this application. As predicted, the full Shapley value
calculation is shown to be intractable. When the number
of players exceeds 16, the sampling method significantly
reduces the computation time, and with the same number
of players the computation time is largely in proportion to
the number of samples specified.
Table 1. Model Computation Time (s)
No. players 8 12 16 20 30 50
full model 25 466 1E+4 N/A N/A N/A
103 samples/p 11 187 2E+3 6E+3 2E+4 N/A
102 samples/p 10 104 221 741 2E+3 2E+4
We then compare the model results for the 16-player game,
the largest game that can be computed for a full model
within a reasonable time. From Fig. 2 we can see that the
Shapley value estimation accuracy with 103 samples per
player is very high, whereas the estimation with 102 is
slightly less accurate. This confirms that there is a trade-
off between the computation time and the accuracy of the
model when choosing the number of samples.
In order to understand this trade-off better when the
number of prosumer is further increased. We select a game
of 30 prosumers and compare the estimated Shapley values
with the two different sample sizes, and the results are
plotted in Fig. 3. Even though the computation time for
the 103 samples/player model is about 10 times the 102
samples/player model, see Table 1, the estimated Shapley
values from the two models are very similar regardless of
the type of resources owned by a prosumer. This gives
us confidence in using a relatively low number of samples
(≥ 102 samples/player) to estimate the Shapley value of
larger P2P cooperative games.
4.2 Sampling-Based Shapley Value for Large Games
For a P2P cooperative game with 50 prosumers, we use
250 samples/player to ensure each coalitional stratus is
sufficiently represented in the samples while keeping the
5 Running on Apple iMac with a processor of 2.8 GHz Intel Core i5
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Fig. 4. Estimated Shapley value by DER ownership type
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computation within an acceptable time. First, we keep the
number of PV and ES systems the same and vary their
adoption rates together. Fig. 4 compares the estimated
Shapley values by players’ DER ownership type, where
each marker represents a prosumer’s estimated Shapley
value. There are a few interesting observations. First,
except for a few outliers, prosumers with the same DER
ownership type are rewarded similar Shapley values re-
gardless of the overall DER adoption rate. Second, as the
DER adoption rates change, there is a significant shift
in the Shapley values; when the DER adoption rates are
low, PV owners are awarded significantly higher Shapley
values likely because they provide cheaper energy to the
coalitions, while when the DER adoption rates are high,
pure consumers and ES owners are awarded higher Shapley
values likely because they absorb more local generation.
Third, as the DER adoption rates increase, the average
Shapley values by DER ownership type tends to converge
despite the wider spread among the pure consumers and
prosumers with only ES systems.
With the same 50 prosumers, we then pick out four typical
prosumers with different DER ownership types, and run
the P2P cooperative model under four different scenarios:
1) PV adoption rate is fixed at 30%, and ES adoption rate
varies from 10% to 50%, 2) PV adoption rate is fixed at
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Fig. 5. Estimated Shapley value with varying PV and ES
adoption rates
50%, and ES adoption rate varies from 10% to 50%, 3)
ES adoption is rate fixed at 30%, and PV adoption rate
varies from 10% to 50%, and 4) PV and ES are with the
same adoption rate that varies from 10% to 50%. Fig. 5
illustrates how the Shapley value changes with different
DER adoption rates. Based on the DER ownership type,
the trend at which the Shapley value changes with the
varying DER adoption rates can be very different. For
example, a consumer that does not own any PV or ES
tends to be awarded more when the adoption rates for the
PV and ES increase together, whereas a prosumer that
owns both PV and ES display the opposite trend. It is
interesting to note that when the PV adoption rate is fixed,
whether at 30% or 50%, varying the ES adoption rate has
very little influence on the Shapley value regardless of the
prosumer type. In contrast, whether the ES adoption rate
is fixed at 30% or follows the PV adoption rate, varying the
PV adoption rate has a significant impact on the Shapley
value of all prosumer types.
It is worth noting that the main purpose of the case studies
is to validate the scalability of the proposed sampling
method applied in the P2P cooperative game. The specific
results shown are dependent on the assumptions made
about the PV, ES system specifications, and the energy
prices. Further sensitivity analyses need to be conducted
to generalize the results to other markets.
5. CONCLUSION
To improve the scalability of the P2P cooperative game
(Han et al., 2018), this paper modifies a stratified ran-
dom sampling method (Castro et al., 2017) to estimate
the Shapley value. The maximum size of the game that
can be computed in a reasonable time (< 10 hours) is
thus increased from less than 20 players to 50 players.
Through case studies, the estimation errors are shown
to be very small. The proposed model is then run on a
P2P cooperative game of 50 players to demonstrate some
interesting patterns and trends in the Shapley value for
different prosumer DER ownership types and with varying
DER adoption rates. Some future work includes sensitivity
analyses on the PV and ES system inputs and electricity
prices, and improving the sampling method to be able to
further scale up the size of the P2P cooperative game.
REFERENCES
Castro, J., Go´mez, D., Molina, E., and Tejada, J. (2017).
Improving polynomial estimation of the Shapley value
by stratified random sampling with optimum allocation.
Computers and Operations Research, 82, 180–188. doi:
10.1016/j.cor.2017.01.019.
Castro, J., Go´mez, D., and Tejada, J. (2009). Polynomial
calculation of the Shapley value based on sampling.
Computers and Operations Research, 36(5), 1726–1730.
doi:10.1016/j.cor.2008.04.004.
Chapman, A.C., Mhanna, S., and Verbicˇ, G. (2017). Co-
operative Game Theory for Non-linear Pricing of Load-
side Distribution Network Support. The 3rd IJCAI
Algorithmic Game Theory Workshop.
Han, L., Morstyn, T., and McCulloch, M. (2018). Con-
structing prosumer coalitions for energy cost savings
using cooperative game theory. In 2018 Power Sys-
tems Computation Conference (PSCC), 1–7. doi:
10.23919/PSCC.2018.8443054.
Han, L., Morstyn, T., and McCulloch, M. (2019). In-
centivizing prosumer coalitions with energy manage-
ment using cooperative game theory. IEEE Trans-
actions on Power Systems, 34(1), 303–313. doi:
10.1109/TPWRS.2018.2858540.
Jacobsen, H.K. and Schroder, S.T. (2012). Curtail-
ment of renewable generation: Economic optimality
and incentives. Energy Policy, 49, 663 – 675. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.07.004. Special
Section: Fuel Poverty Comes of Age: Commemorating
21 Years of Research and Policy.
Jia, L. and Tong, L. (2016). Dynamic pricing and
distributed energy management for demand response.
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 7(2), 1128–1136.
doi:10.1109/TSG.2016.2515641.
Morstyn, T., Hredzak, B., Aguilera, R.P., and Agelidis,
V.G. (2018). Model predictive control for distributed
microgrid battery energy storage systems. IEEE Trans-
actions on Control Systems Technology, 26(3), 1107–
1114. doi:10.1109/TCST.2017.2699159.
Parag, Y. and Sovacool, B.K. (2016). Electricity market
design for the prosumer era. Nature Energy, (March),
16032. doi:10.1038/nenergy.2016.32.
Sajjad, I.A., Chicco, G., and Napoli, R. (2016). Definitions
of demand flexibility for aggregate residential loads.
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 7(6), 2633–2643.
doi:10.1109/TSG.2016.2522961.
Shapley, L.S. (1971). Cores of convex games. Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory, 1(1), 11–26. doi:
10.1007/BF01753431.
Skea, J., Anderson, D., Green, T., Gross, R., Hepton-
stall, P., and Leach, M. (2007). Intermittent renewable
generation and the cost of maintaining power system
reliability. Generation, Transmission & Distribution,
IET, 1(2), 324. doi:10.1049/iet-gtd.
Weber, R. (1977). Probabilistic values for games. Cowles
Foundation Discussion Papers 471R, Cowles Foundation
for Research in Economics, Yale University.
Zhou, Y., Wu, J., and Long, C. (2018). Evaluation of peer-
to-peer energy sharing mechanisms based on a multia-
gent simulation framework. Applied Energy, 222(Febru-
ary), 993–1022. doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.02.089.
